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Management and Use of Wild Animals1 
P. Sandøe & S. B. Christiansen.  
Co-author: Bengt Holst, Scientific Director, Copenhagen Zoo, Denmark  
 
The animals which are the focus of this chapter differ in an important respect from those discussed in 
previous chapters: living and breeding without human interference, they are the products of natural 
evolution. They are wild animals. But if wild animals live independently of us, why examine them in a book 
about animal use? There are two reasons for this.  
The first reason is that, throughout human history, man has made use of wild animals. We have fished for, 
trapped and hunted wild animals to acquire food and non-food products like fur. Wild animals have also 
been a source of entertainment. Since ancient times they have been on display in circuses and and markets. 
In more recent times, zoos and wildlife parks have developed in large numbers, and it has become common 
for ordinary people to keep wild animals such as fish, birds, and reptiles. 
The second reason for bringing wild animals into a discussion of animal use is that, increasingly, they are not 
just left to live their own lives. In fact it seems fair to say that the human desire to conquer wild nature has 
been all too successful, since many wild species have become extinct, and even more are believed to be 
endangered. In reaction to this, a nature and wildlife protection movement has grown over the last 200 years. 
Often this protection will take the form of active management, with some species being controlled in order to 
allow other species to prosper. 
From the point of view of animal ethics, an important shift of focus typically takes place when wild animals 
are on the agenda. In discussions of the protection of domestic animals the focus is normally on the 
individual animals. When it comes to wild animals, however, the focus is typically on the species or on a 
population. What often seems to matter here is that a sufficient number of animals survive in the wild and 
produce offspring. Whether individual animals or groups have a tough time often matters less – and indeed 
may sometimes even be seen to make a positive contribution by applying the right kind of selective pressure 
on the species as a whole. 
                                                          
1This text is an excerpt from Chapter 10 of: 
P. Sandøe & S. B. Christiansen (2008): Ethics of animal use. 1. Edition. Chichester, United Kingdom. Wiley-Blackwell.  
The definitive version is available at 
http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-140515120X.html 
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So what are our responsibilities to individual wild animals? How should we balance the different, potentially 
conflicting ethical concerns? These are the questions to be discussed in this chapter. To begin with it will be 
asked how human approaches to the treatment and management of wild animals have evolved through 
history. 
 
Developments in human relations with wild animals  
 
In prehistoric times, when humans were mainly living as hunters and gatherers, wild animals seem to have 
been more than a source of food and fur – as is witnessed by cave paintings and rock carvings. One may 
speculate that at least some wild animals were then regarded with a degree of reverence.  
Early human cultures based on hunting contributed to the local extermination of some animal species, 
although this seems to have been more of an exception than the general rule. With the development of 
cultures based on agriculture, the human impact on wildlife became much greater, mainly because humans 
were successfully competing with wild animals for land. Some predator species were hunted down, because 
they were seen as a threat to farm animals. For instance, the wolf once had a wider distribution than any 
other land mammal except man. Due to systematic hunting, however, by 1950 the grey wolf was wiped out 
across most of its natural habitat. It has survived only in areas of the northern hemisphere sparsely populated 
by humans. 
In early Christian culture little reverence for wild animals remained. The mainstream attitude within 
Christian culture, as described in Chapter 1, has been, first, that animals are there for us to use as resources; 
and, second, that wild nature is something dark and frightening that should as far as possible be cultivated. 
Paradise, to the Christian mind, is a cultivated garden, not a wilderness. Of course, there is a belief within 
Christianity that wild nature deserves protection because it is part of God’s creation. However, this idea 
seems in practice to have had limited influence. Also, many of the changes in the wildlife habitats were 
gradual and therefore barely noticed; and there always seemed to be large areas of nature left to which 
wildlife could retreat. 
The idea of systematic protection of the natural world, including wild animals, first developed in North 
America. Whereas our impact on nature was slow in Europe, in North America the effects of human activity 
on wildlife and other parts of wild nature, following colonization, were rapid and vast. For example, the 
passenger pigeon which inhabited North America in billions around 1800 became extinct in a little more than 
a hundred years, and a similar fate nearly befell the bison. 
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In the 1800s the idea of establishing national parks where wild nature could be protected therefore 
developed. Such parks were established on a huge scale in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Later national 
parks spread to Africa, Australia, Asia, and Europe. However, those involved in initiatives to create national 
parks and in other ways protect wild nature did not fully agree over the goal of nature protection. From the 
beginning there were two main approaches: wise use of nature and preservation (protect nature from use). 
(In North America the term “conservation” is often used as a synonym of wise use. However, in other parts 
of the world it often covers both wise use and preservation. To avoid confusion about the terminology the 
term “conservation” will be avoided.) 
The idea of wise use appeals to our self-interest. However, sometimes the issue may rather be that we affect 
the interests of future people. Underlining the notion that we should control our use of wildlife and other 
renewable resources to allow future generations to obtain their share, the idea of wise use has developed into 
the idea of sustainable use. This idea received its most influential statement by an international commission 
headed by the former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. According to this commission, 
sustainable use is part and parcel of sustainable development, which is a “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 
1987, p. 43). 
The two approaches – wise or sustainable use and preservation – are united in their opposition to the 
unthinking marginalization or destruction of wildlife. But when it comes to the actual management of 
wildlife and nature, the two approaches differ. For the wise or sustainable use approach, the aim is to 
accommodate man’s continuous use of wild nature as a resource for food, timber and other raw materials, 
and for recreation. Approaches to management that enhance nature’s yield as a resource are very welcome. 
For the preservationist, on the other hand, the aim is, as far as possible, to bring nature back to the state it 
was in before humans started to interfere, and then to allow it to develop on its own with as little interference 
from humans as possible. The only use that humans should make of nature is to enjoy it from a distance. 
One practice, which continues to give rise to controversy between the two approaches, is recreational 
hunting. On the wise use approach, the active management of game should be encouraged. This can include 
the control of predators, the release of young animals (sometimes of species that are not native to the area in 
question), and feeding during some periods of the year. In this way, it is claimed, a healthy population of 
game can be maintained. Hunters, who own the right to shoot the game in some locations, will both benefit 
recreationally and bring home resources such as food and fur. Moreover, they will have a strong incentive to 
maintain the area of nature for which they are responsible, assuming they want to make use of the area in the 
future.  
Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment 
This is a post-print version of a chapter from the book 
Ethics of animal use published by Wiley-Blackwell 
For more articles on animal ethics, see www.animalethics.net 
 
On the preservation approach, on the other hand, this kind of practice goes against the whole idea of nature 
protection. It applies artificial, selective pressure in favour of game species, some of which may even be non-
native. Hence it fundamentally disturbs the balance which it is the aim of nature protection to achieve. Of 
course, even on the preservation approach the shooting of animals may sometimes be seen as a necessity. It 
may be that there is a lack of predators to maintain the (perceived) natural balance, and that this can be 
redressed by judicious use of control methods. But hunting should then be planned with preservation goals in 
mind, and it should ideally be carried out by professionals. 
Even though the two approaches to nature protection differ in their end goals, they have in practice been able 
largely to unite in a shared effort to limit the devastation of nature that has occurred globally over the past 
century or so. In 1900 nature protection was basically a local affair. But it has gradually become clear that 
the roots of many of the problems affecting wild nature are more complex and of a much larger scale, and 
that solutions will require a global, long-term approach. 
One important development is the rise of the modern environmental movement, the origin of which can be 
dated to 1962 when the American biologist, Rachel Carson (1907-1964), published Silent Spring. The title of 
the book depicts a situation where no birds sing in the spring because they have all vanished as a result of 
pollution, the use of pesticides and similar causes. Pesticides can accumulate via the food chain and spread 
far beyond the point at which they are released. For instance, DDT and other chemicals once widely used 
may accumulate via the food chain in polar bears and birds of prey living in the arctic region, thousands of 
kilometres away from where these chemicals were originally used. Some researchers suspect that these 
chemicals can seriously damage the reproductive ability of animals, and in the long run threaten their 
survival. 
In the beginning, the environmental movement stood in stark opposition to strong political and economic 
interests. However, gradually the messages of the movement gained public support and were appropriated by 
the economic and political establishments. Today in most industrialised countries the use of pesticides and 
other agrochemicals is regulated, and use of the most harmful pesticides, such as DDT, has long been banned 
in agriculture. Moreover, organic production – where farming of crops for food, feed and other products is 
done without the use of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides or fungicides – is expanding all over the 
world. 
Most recently there has been a shift in the environmental movement towards a focus on energy use and its 
effect on the climate. The world is becoming warmer, and this is having severe effects on living conditions 
both for people and wildlife. Again, polar bears are a primary focus. It is feared that, with global warming, 
their natural habitat will diminish dramatically. 
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A parallel development has been a growing international focus on the protection of biodiversity. Wild animal 
populations do not respect national borders – they are typically spread across several countries. Starting in 
the 1940s, international collaboration to protect wild nature has developed. To begin with such collaboration 
mainly assumed the wise use approach. It aimed to protect nature as a renewable resource. However, since 
the 1970s, there has been rising concern about the preservation and protection of biodiversity in itself, i.e. as 
something with its own intrinsic value. In 1992 an international Convention on Biological Diversity was 
signed by 150 government leaders. Here it is asserted that the conservation of biological diversity is “a 
common concern of humankind” (United Nations 1993, p. 143). 
An international organisation with headquarters in Geneva (the IUCN, or World Conservation Union) 
regularly publishes so-called “red lists” in which the statuses of endangered animals and plants are listed. On 
the 2006 list the status of 40 000 species, subspecies, varieties, and even selected subpopulations are 
assessed. These lists help policy makers to decide which species are most in need of protection. Through 
international agreements, countries are assigned responsibilities for the protection of specific species. This 
system has not stopped the decline in wildlife, but it has put a global focus on the status of wild organisms, 
and in that way it has facilitated the process of preserving nature.  
A special problem in the protection of wildlife is the trade in animals and animal products. For various 
reasons there is a big international market for wild animals and associated products. This market includes 
eggs from rare birds, live reptiles, birds and mammals, ivory, and various other products. 
A well known example is rhino horn. In the Yemen, in the Middle East, the horn is used to make handles for 
ceremonial knives, called “jambiyas”, which are worn by young men. After the oil crisis in the 1970s, oil 
prices climbed and the wealth of people living in the Yemen rose. This led to a vast increase in the demand 
for rhino horn. The consequences for the black rhino in Africa were devastating. In 1970 an estimated 65 000 
black rhinos could be found throughout sub-Saharan Africa, but during the following decades most of them 
were killed by poachers. Around the year 2000 there were fewer than 2500 left. 
To contain the negative effects of international trade on wild nature, a Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was prepared in the 1970s and later signed by most 
countries around the world. Again, many countries make a great effort to back up their commitment to nature 
protection by setting up special police units with the sole duty of controlling imports and sales of animals 
and plants belonging to endangered species. 
One reason for the growing support for wildlife protection – not least in rich Western countries – has been 
the highly successful campaigning and lobbying by international non-governmental organisations such as the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the International Fund for 
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Animal Welfare (IFAW). These organisations have not only raised public awareness of the need for wildlife 
protection but in some cases also managed to steer the agenda away from wise use and towards either 
preservation or a focus on the protection of wild animals from cruelty. 
This is clearly seen in debates about the protection of sea mammals. When the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) was set up after the Second World War to regulate the hunting of large whales, the main 
aim was to ensure that whale species were not depleted – i.e. that they would be restored and maintained at a 
level that would allow whaling in the future. However, the majority of IWC members increasingly turned 
towards the idea of banning all commercial whaling. A ban was implemented in 1986. It has not been lifted 
since – even for populations of whales that by scientific standards seem to be able to tolerate a controlled 
hunt. 
With whales, animal welfare issues – relating to killing methods – also became an issue. And with another 
group of sea animals, seals, animal welfare became the dominant issue. Since the 1960s there has been 
ongoing public debate about the killing of so-called baby seals by clubbing in the northern parts of Canada. 
The debate kicked off in the 1960s and 1970s. It was promoted by very efficient use of the mass media by 
those who were against the killing of seals. Newspapers reported stories and published pictures of what were 
depicted as brutal murders of cute baby seals with large dark eyes. At the same time, the newspapers carried 
advertisements with graphic images and very emotional supporting texts covering entire pages. The 
campaign was also supported by celebrities of the time, including the French film actress Brigitte Bardot (b. 
1934). The arguments of those campaigning against seal hunting were, and still are, a combination of claims 
about the cruelty of the killing and a strongly negative aesthetic appeal. The campaign seems to have 
worked: in 1983 the EEC (now the EU) implemented a ban of baby seal fur imports which is still in effect. A 
side-effect of the campaign was a drop in prices on all seal products. This has had a dramatic negative effect 
on arctic communities for which seal hunting was a major source of income. 
Clearly, over the last few centuries there has been a dramatic change in our relations with wild animals. 
Three key ideas – of wise or sustainable use, preservation, and animal welfare – continue to play a role in 
discussions concerning the use and management of wild animals. This, of course, gives rise to dilemmas: for 
instance, between sustaining human livelihood and the preservation of some species, or between protecting 
the well-being of the individual animal and protecting the species. Some of these dilemmas will be discussed 
later in this chapter. First, however, a little more needs to be said about the ethical perspective called “respect 
for nature” briefly presented in Chapter 2. This perspective grows out of the idea of preservation. Unlike the 
other ethical perspectives explored, it has not been very prominent in previous chapters, all of which have 
focused on domestic animals. 
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Respect for nature – extending the concern? 
 
When it comes to the topic of nature and wildlife, the three main ethical views discussed in previous chapters 
– contractarianism, utilitarianism and the animal rights position – seem to share a very important assumption. 
All assume that it is only individual sentient beings that matter ethically in their own right and have inherent 
moral standing. None would ascribe intrinsic value, let alone moral rights, to plants, habitats or species as 
such. Entities such as these only matter because, and in so far as, they matter to relevant sentient beings. 
In contractarianism, to have moral standing a being must be able to enter into some kind of agreement with 
another being. Only contractors have moral status. Essentially this means that only human beings (and 
indeed, only some of them) have moral standing. The two other views disagree with this – they extend the 
ascription of moral standing to all humans as well as to some animals. Utilitarians claim that it is the ability 
to feel pleasure and pain that confers moral standing. From the animal rights perspective, what matters is that 
a being is subject of a life. In practice the two views will not differ much over which beings are owed moral 
consideration.  
The main point here is that these three ethical outlooks agree that entities that are not sentient have no 
inherent moral standing. However, this may run counter to intuitions many people may have about our moral 
obligations to living beings that are probably not sentient. For instance, if you see someone stepping on a 
flower for no good reason, you may feel that something wrong is being done. Of course, this feeling may 
have to do with the aesthetic value that you, and other potential spectators, attribute to the flower. But 
perhaps this is not the whole story: some may feel that it is wrong to step on the flower, even if it is not seen 
or is going to be seen by anyone who will appreciate its beauty – that this kind of act is in itself morally 
objectionable. 
The American philosopher Paul Taylor feels precisely this way, and so strongly that he has developed a 
theory in which moral standing is extended to all living entities. He claims that we should measure the 
rightness of actions, and assess the moral quality of a person’s character, according to whether or not he or 
she expresses what he calls “respect for nature”. The idea is that we as humans try to see the world from a 
point of view where we consider what is good and bad for all living beings affected by what we do:  
Concerning a butterfly, for example, we may hesitate to speak of its interests or preferences, and 
we would probably deny outright that it values anything in the sense of considering it good or 
desirable. But once we come to understand its life cycle and know the environmental conditions it 
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needs to survive in a healthy state, we have no difficulty in speaking about what is beneficial and 
what might be harmful to it. […] Once we acknowledge that it is meaningful to speak about what is 
good or bad for an organism as seen from the standpoint of its own good, we humans can make 
value judgements from the perspective of the organism’s life, even if the organism itself can neither 
make nor understand those judgements. All of the foregoing considerations hold true of plants as 
well as animals. (Taylor 1986, pp. 66-67) 
So stepping on the flower damages the flower, and just as you should not damage or harm humans and 
animals without good reason, you also ought not to damage plants – as far as possible. The last clause is 
important. As the realm of beings to which we owe moral concern widens, it becomes more difficult to avoid 
doing things that will have a negative impact on beings to whom, or to which, we owe moral concern. If we 
are not permitted to kill animals for food, we can become vegans; but it is not really an option to stop eating 
plants. Those who try to live lives in harmony with the idea of respect for nature will have to accommodate 
trade-offs. 
The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (b. 1912), known as the founder of the philosophy, and the modern 
movement, of deep ecology, has expressed a view similar to Paul Taylor’s in order to cater for this 
challenge: 
… Biospherical egalitarianism – in principle. The “in principle” clause is inserted because any 
realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. (Næss 1973, p. 95) 
That is to say, all living beings should be treated as equals, but if some individuals are to survive and lead 
decent lives, it is necessary in practice to sacrifice others. However, both Taylor and Næss insist that there is 
a big difference between saying that some living beings, such as plants, have no moral standing and therefore 
can be used as we please, and saying that the moral standing of some living things, such as food plants, is 
such that in certain (admittedly, quite common) circumstances their exploitation and killing can be morally 
defended. 
 
Individualism versus holism 
It might be argued that there is something strange about trying “as far as possible” to protect all individual 
plants. The problem is the elasticity, and the extendability, of the notion of possibility here. Suppose you are 
tending a garden. The question is then not really whether you should protect plants, but which plants you 
should protect. If you do nothing, you will let weeds take over, and if you weed, you allow other plants to 
survive and thrive. So the issue is not really about protecting or not protecting individual plants, but about 
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the whole garden you are managing. Whatever you do you will harm plants in large numbers; the choice 
remains between creating or maintaining a certain kind of cultivated garden, or allowing it to become a 
wilder, weedier, “natural style” garden. 
This kind of thinking has actually led most influential proponents of respect for nature to give up the idea of 
nature protection as an extension of the concern for individuals. Rather they now claim that we should not be 
concerned about individual organisms when we are concerned about nature. We should look at collective 
entities such as species, biotopes, and ecosystems. This approach is evident in the following passage by 
American philosopher J. Baird Callicott (b. 1941): 
Animal liberationists claim to be philosophical radicals, but animal rights is just one more step on 
the liberal continuum, whereas the Leopold land ethic, because it attributes pre-eminent importance 
to the health of ecosystems, is a point off of this individualistic continuum. (Callicott 1980, p. 313). 
So, according to Callicott, the radically new feature of the idea of respect for nature is that it is not 
individualistic: that is, it is not concerned primarily with protecting individuals, but focuses on the protection 
of higher level entities of which individuals are only transient elements. Callicott does not claim to have 
invented this idea. He in fact builds on the writings of the forester, and father of modern wildlife 
management in the United States, Aldo Leopold (1887-1948). Leopold’s ideas about the overall strategy of 
nature management are laid out in his so-called “land ethic”: 
The ‘key-log’ which must be removed to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply 
this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in 
terms of what is ethically and aesthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It 
is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1949, p. 262) 
But if individual plants only matter in so far as they contribute to the maintenance of a larger whole of some 
kind (the biotic community, the land, the ecosystem), what then about individual animals and individual 
humans? Do they also, in the respect for nature approach, only matter in so far as they contribute to 
maintaining and protecting nature? In an influential early paper by Callicott a positive answer to this 
question is affirmed: 
Modern systems of ethics have, it must be admitted, considered the principle of the equality of 
persons to be inviolable. This is true, for example, of both major schools of modern ethics, the 
utilitarian school going back to Bentham and Mill, and the deontological, originating with Kant. 
The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of the 
biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, take note, human individuals) is 
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relative, to be assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity 
which Leopold called “land”. (Callicott 1995, p. 47) 
In this view, then, individuals really do not matter in their own right. Whether they are human or not, they 
matter only to the extent that, and only when, they help to maintain the wholes of which they are parts. There 
is here a certain similarity to utilitarianism where the individual only matters to the extent that she, he or it 
contributes to the total sum of welfare. However, there is also the important difference that what matters 
from the utilitarian point of view is welfare; and welfare is also what matters to individuals. So according to 
the utilitarian view one may disregard individuals for the sake of other individuals, whereas in Callicott’s 
opinion individuals may be sacrificed for the sake of a collective entity. 
To make this point vivid, Callicott argues in the same essay that the human population on earth ought to be 
reduced in size so that human numbers are the same as those of bears. 
No wonder this gave rise to strong reactions! Tom Regan, the leading proponent of the animal rights view, 
labelled Callicott’s view “environmental fascism” (1988, p. 362). The analogy is here with the Nazi regime, 
which notoriously claimed that individuals must be sacrificed for the sake of the higher goal of maintaining 
the nation. 
In later essays Callicott has retreated from his earlier position. Now, like nearly all the other advocates of the 
respect for nature approach, he thinks the protection of nature should not generally override respect or 
concern for the individual human or animal, but rather should be seen as an addition to traditional, 
individualistic ethics. However, if the protection of nature matters, dilemmas between nature protection and 
respect for individuals will continue to arise. 
There are many real life examples of such dilemmas, for example: as mentioned earlier, DDT used in other 
parts of the world spreads via food chains as far as the arctic areas. There may, therefore, be a choice to be 
made between protecting wildlife in non-tropical areas by campaigning for a total ban on DDT and 
promoting the use of DDT as a means to fight malaria. It has been argued by medical doctors and health 
officials that attempts to ban DDT globally have setback the fight against malaria in the tropics. The claim is 
that the success of attempts by environmental groups to protect wildlife in non-tropical areas through 
campaigns against DDT have cost hundreds of thousands human lives. 
Similarly, nature protection and animal welfare may compete with one another. The most effective methods 
of eradicating feral animals (e.g. rabbits in Australia or minks in northern Europe) to protect local nature 
from “invasion” by imported species may be problematic from the point of view of animal welfare. 
Poisoning, trapping and shooting all year round, even when the animals have offspring, may be efficient 
means of controlling invasive species, but they bring about considerable animal suffering. 
Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment 
This is a post-print version of a chapter from the book 
Ethics of animal use published by Wiley-Blackwell 
For more articles on animal ethics, see www.animalethics.net 
 
Therefore, a credible version of the respect for nature approach will have to indicate how nature protection is 
to be balanced against the needs, interests, and rights of individual humans and animals. 
 
What is nature? 
One question raised by the respect for nature position – a question was touched upon in Chapter 9 – is 
absolutely fundamental: what is nature? One way to approach this question is by trying to describe the 
opposite of nature. Few would dispute the assertion that wild animals that inhabit rainforests, savannas, and 
seas, and have done so for thousands or millions of years, are part of nature and worth protecting. If it is 
animals such as these that define “nature”, the opposite of nature seems to be culture. Nature can be defined 
then, roughly, as that which is untouched by humans. 
On this view, animals that have not been domesticated and do not live where they do as the result of human 
interference are natural. This is a relatively clear and intuitively plausible way of thinking about the natural 
realm. It also makes good sense of the kind of protection of untouched nature that takes place in many parts 
of the world. However, it certainly does not fit the situation in areas, like Europe, that have been under 
human control for thousands of years. In these areas it is hard to find parts of nature that are untouched and 
unaffected by human activity. The landscapes protected in nature conservation schemes are often old cultural 
landscapes, such as grazed meadows, moors, and certain forms of woodland endangered by urbanization and 
developments in agriculture and forestry. Even though many of the animals living here are genuinely wild, 
they have nevertheless co-evolved with humans and have at best a rather dubious claim to be creatures of a 
kind untouched by man. 
At this point it must be asked why, from a philosophical point of view, only that which is untouched by man 
should be counted as natural. Is man not also an animal, and are not the effects of man’s activities also part 
of the natural ecosystem? And the idea that we are in some sense separated from nature, is that not really a 
residue of dualistic thinking that goes back to ancient philosophy, and which has had a strong influence on 
Christianity, but which really has no place in an enlightened, modern world view? These are truly mind 
boggling questions, and no attempt shall here be made to answer them. 
It will suffice to say that there are many different conceptions of nature. Nature may be defined as that which 
is untouched by man; or it may be defined in a way that ensures that an animal or plant is natural, and 
therefore according to the view of respect for nature worth protecting, even though its association with 
human activity is undeniable. The latter view will allow, or even oblige, us to protect not only “genuinely” 
wild animals and the ecosystems and landscapes to which they belong, but also cultural landscapes and the 
creatures that live there.  
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Regarding domestic animals there is, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a real issue about breeds of 
domestic animal that are under pressure from the tendency of modern farm animal breeding to focus on a 
few breeds. For example, in Norway, until the early 1970s, there were more than 20 local breeds of dairy 
cattle, each with a distinct phenotype. Only one of these breeds was the focus of intensive breeding, and this 
is now the only one breed left in commercial milk production. Should these old breeds be maintained, not 
only for the sake of future breeding, but also in their own right? From the perspective of respect for nature, 
the answer to this question clearly depends on how nature is defined. 
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